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Abstract 
The recent growth of online recruitment and candidate management systems has established yet 
another media for fraudsters on the internet. The ever-growing size of the candidate pool has 
forced different industries to move to web-based candidate management systems. The 
advantages of such web-based systems are substantial. On one hand, they are the best means to 
filter through thousands of applicants for employers and on the other hand, the candidates find 
themselves in a convenient position while applying for a position. People with fraudulent 
motivations explore these systems to lure candidates in a hoax and extract sensitive information 
(e.g. contact information) using fake job advertisements. In this paper, we analyzed a publicly 
available dataset and used machine learning algorithms to classify job postings as fraudulent or 
legitimate. The contribution of this research is the inclusion of contextual features in the feature 
space, which revealed compelling improvements of accuracy, precision and recall.  
 
Keywords: Online recruitment, Fraud detection, Employment scam, Online recruitment fraud, 
Contextual features. 
1. Introduction  
Online recruitment fraud (ORF) is one of the most serious problems in recent times on the 
internet. Although the problem imposes serious threats on personal & social security and 
privacy, it has not been addressed by the research community to the extent that matches the 
demand of the severity. ORF is a form of employment scam where a person with fraudulent 
intensions posts a fake job advertisement on an online platform targeting job seekers. Naïve or 
desperate job seekers do not think about the legitimacy of the advertisement and end up 
revealing personal information. This sensitive information is then used by the fraudsters in 
many ways, compromising the privacy and security of the job seekers. According to an 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) report [1], a total amount of AUD 
212,784 in Australia has been lost during the month of October 2017 alone, due to online 
recruitment frauds. During that period, a frightening number of 237 employment scams were 
carried out by fraudsters throughout the country.  
There are even more severe consequences of ORF than financial loss. Sometimes the 
fraudsters can even ask for sensitive information to be handed over to the potential employers 
which can be used to conduct further criminal activities, such as money laundering, reshipping 
fraud, identity theft and so on. A news report [2] published by Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation portrays a shocking story of a young man who was convinced enough by a fake 
job advertisement to send a copy of his passport, driver’s license and tax file number to someone 
he thought, was a potential employer. The information that these documents hold is more than 
sufficient to conduct an identity theft or a similar crime. Apart from simple contact information, 
through ORF, people with fraudulent intentions can gather personal information such as home 
address, educational background, work experience profile and other socioeconomic data and 
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sell the consolidated dataset to third parties such as call-centres. Some scammers even ask for 
money from the applicants at a later stage of a fake recruitment process as visa, travel expenses 
or started-kit expenses.  
Due to the structured nature of online recruitment advertisements, it is very hard to 
distinguish fraudulent job advertisements from legitimate ones. Most of the online recruitment 
sites have a specific skeleton for job postings that gives the fraudsters an advantage to blend in. 
Sometimes, the differences are so insignificant that it is very hard to detect the fraudulent 
advertisement even with human analysis. The lucrative financial offer, flexible work hours can 
easily trick people into applying for a well-crafter job advertisement. Similar fraudulent online 
behaviours have been heavily investigated by researchers in the information system domain [3-
14]. Email spamming, phishing, cyberbullying, opinion fraud and many more, are problems 
that are similar to ORF as they can be categorised as improper user behaviours on the web. 
Nevertheless, the problem of ORF presents some challenges due to the lack of contextual 
information on the recruitment sites and a very short time span of interaction between the user 
and the system.  
Existing methodologies for detection of ORFs [15,16] utilizes textual and structural 
information from the job postings but fails to take into consideration, the importance of 
contextual information about the organization that offers the job. The theoretical and practical 
importance of contextual features about different actors, have been analysed by researchers in 
different domains, such as cyberbullying detection [10,11], opinion fraud detection [3] and 
crowdturfing detection [13,14]. In the case of recruitment fraud, the actor whose contextual 
information plays an important role in successful detection, is the offering organization. The 
contextual information includes organization’s history, reputation, internet footprint and so on, 
which are described in the methodology section of this paper. Policy makers such as 
government organizations also suggest job seekers to validate an organization’s legitimacy by 
gathering these pieces of contextual information [17,18] before applying for a position 
advertised by the organization. Popular job advertisement portals like SEEK1 also suggest their 
users to search the internet for a company’s footprint before applying for a job.  
Keeping these insights in mind, our research focuses on a novel feature space design that 
not only covers the textual or structural features but also analyses contextual features, in order 
to improve the detection quality of ORF. The research uses the public EMSCAD dataset [19] 
and classifies instances of recruitment circulars as fraudulent or legitimate based on the 
proposed feature space. The learned model is analysed and evaluated using traditional data 
mining metrics, such as accuracy, precision and recall.  
The remaining paper is organized in the following sections: Section 2 discusses some 
relevant research works, Section 3 elaborates the research methodology and proposed feature 
space, Section 4 describes the experimental setup and evaluates the proposed model and Section 
5 concludes the paper with remarks on the managerial implications of our work and future 
improvement scopes. 
2. Related work  
Research in the field of cybercrime and deception detection are more often than not, domain 
specific. The generalized area consists of, but not limited to domains, such as phishing, email 
spam, cyberbullying, Wikipedia vandalism, trolling, opinion fraud, astroturfing, malware 
attack, cross-site scripting, online predation, financial fraud, identity theft, employment scam 
and so on. It is outside the scope of this paper to cover previous research works in all of these 
domains. However, in terms of related approaches, a number of research works [3-16] focused 
on feature space design, natural language processing (NLP) and machine learning techniques, 
which we cover in this section. 




 The research work by Stringhini, et al. [3] designed a feature space based on empirical 
analysis on social networks traits and trained a Random Forest classifier to detect email spam, 
whereas Boykin and Roychowdhury [4] focused on extracting features from the message body 
and message header for training a Bayesian classifier. Yeh, et al. [5] on the other hand, focused 
on meta-heuristics to propose a feature space based on user behavior. The approach of 
extraction of binary features from online text was adopted by Dinakar, et al. [6] to classify 
YouTube comments to detect cyberbullying, whereas other researchers used NLP techniques 
such as Term Frequency–Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF), lexical analysis and 
syntactic-semantic analysis to detect improper behaviors such as phishing, Wikipedia 
vandalism and cyberbullying [7,8,9]. User contexts of online social network (OSN) such as 
gender information and user activity history were considered by several research works 
[10,11,12], in the domain of cyberbullying and trolling. Group and individual contextual 
characteristics were also utilized by several research works [13,14] to identify crowdturfing 
groups on OSN. However, these approaches [3-14] of feature space design are not adequate for 
ORF detection, as the categories of features, included in the feature space, largely depend on 
specific problem domain. Additionally, the structured nature of online recruitment 
advertisements begs careful consideration towards feature selection for successful fraud 
detection.   
To the best of our knowledge, in the domain of ORF or employment scam, one research 
group conducted only two related research [15,16]. The research work done by Vidros, et al. 
[15] analyzed the problem of employment scam for the first time. The authors explained, in 
details, the workflow of hiring a candidate and the role of Application Tracking Systems (ATS) 
within that flow. The authors also mentioned the severity of exploitation of such ATSs. Identity 
theft, financial loss and loss of privacy were some of the main highlights of their motivation. 
They drew the differences and discussed the similarities of recruitment fraud with some of the 
highly studied problem domains such as email spam, cyberbullying, phishing, trolling and 
Wikipedia vandalism. This research work listed some of the challenges of recruitment fraud 
domain which include lack of adherence to any communication protocol, short and one-time 
interaction of users with job advertisements and impersonation of fraudsters as an existing 
business and so on. Their analysis of real-world workable data generated a set of empirical 
rules. 
In order to prove the hypothesis and applicability of the empirical ruleset, Vidros, et al. [16] 
conducted a more comprehensive and extensive research. In this second stage of research, the 
authors generated a real-life dataset of 17,880 instances of job ads where 17,014 were legitimate 
and 866 were fraudulent. The dataset was made public by the authors and is known as the 
EMSCAD [19] dataset. The authors conducted bag-of-word (bow) modelling and empirical 
analysis on a subset of the EMSCAD dataset. Their empirical analysis on geographical 
constraints, textual analysis of spam words, analysis of HTML elements and binary analysis 
provided affective baseline information for ORF detection. The empirical ruleset generated in 
the first paper [15] was expanded in the second [16] and served as a base for the ruleset based 
binary features. They achieved a highest accuracy of 90.56%, recall value of 0.906 and 
precision value of 0.906 using J48 decision tree classifier of WEKA for their binary analysis of 
features. 
Although Vidros, et al. [16] analyzed different aspects of the problem domain by taking 
different approaches to model a solution for detection, the contextual features indicating 
organization’s online profile were not considered by the authors. Also, due to the short span of 
interaction between the user and the online recruitment systems, many aspects of the 
recruitment advertisement itself, are usually ignored by the regular job seekers. To overcome 
these challenges, our research considers the contextual attributes that gives an overall idea about 
the advertising organizations, which are imperative to design a better detection tool. The next 
section elaborates our research methodology for designing a novel feature space that takes into 
account the contextual information about the organization’s background. 
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3. Research methodology 
Our research is mainly driven by the motivation of designing a feature space that can train a 
learning model to detect an instance of job circular or advertisement more accurately. As 
discussed in the related work section, to the best of our knowledge, the closest relevant research 
we could find in the domain was the research conducted by Vidros, et al. [16]. This research 
makes use of the EMSCAD [19] dataset that was made public by the authors of the paper [16]. 
The dataset contained 17,880 real-life job ads posted by Workable [20], a renowned online 
recruitment portal. Each instance of the public dataset is labelled. Each record in the dataset 
had a set of attributes and a binary class label indicating whether or not an instance of a job 
circular is fraudulent. For each record in the dataset, a class label ‘t’ indicates a fraudulent job 
posting whereas, class label ‘f’ indicates that the posting is a legitimate job advertisement. Apart 
from the class label, there are 16 attributes pertaining to each record in the public dataset. The 
values for these attributes for each record are either pure text, or text with HTML tags. Table 1 
lists down all the fields and their short descriptions.  
Table 1. Description of attributes in the EMSCAD dataset. 
Name Description 
Title The title of the job circular  
Location The geographic location of the job  
Department  Internal department of the organization 
Salary range Indicative salary range 
Company profile A brief profile of the company 
Description A detail description of the job 
Requirements Requirements of the job  
Benefits Offered benefits of the job 
Telecommuting True/False based on whether or not the job requires telecommunication 
Company logo True/False based on whether or not the ad contains company logo 
Questions  True/False based on the presence of screening questions  
Employment type Type of employment (full-time, part-time, contract, etc.) 
Required experience Level of experience (Executive, entry level, intern, etc.) 
Required education Level of education (Master’s, bachelor’s degree, etc.) 
Industry Specific industry (IT, healthcare, etc.) 
Function  Specific area of functionality (Engineering, research, sales, etc.) 
Fraudulent Class label (‘f’ means legitimate job ad and ‘t’ means fraudulent job ad) 
 
In our research, the principle idea behind the design of contextual feature space was to 
mimic the human behavior while trying to validate the authenticity of a job circular. An initial 
analysis of the dataset fields reveals that, it is quite challenging for a job seeker to decide 
whether or not a circular is fraudulent just by looking into the field values, which are in terms, 
a direct representation of the real-life job ads. Further investigation of the available government 
and private online articles revealed some insight. For example, an article published by 
Australian Government [17] strongly advices job seekers to search the internet for the company 
website and other information they can find about the company that indicates towards the 
reputation and dependability of the company as an organization. In Australian scenario, if the 
job posting is made by an organization inside Australia, the Government also suggests checking 
the Australian Business Register [18] for the company details. The idea is to have a way to 
validate the existence of the company’s internet footprint. Also, instinctively, when we need to 
find out something about an entity, whether or not the entity is an organization, the first place 
we look for is the internet. Given the information availability provided by the search engines, 
the existence of a company can be validated by a human in several minutes who has basic 
knowledge of using the internet. If the corresponding employer of a job ad turns out to be an 
invalid company, it is almost certain that the job ad is also invalid. 
In order to acquire information about a company, the first thing we needed was the name 
of the company. The EMSCAD [19] public dataset does not contain such information. Our 
ISD2018 SWEDEN 
  
approach to resolve this problem involved two significant steps. First, to extract a name for a 
company from the text listed as company profile in the dataset. Second, to extract some 
contextual information about the company using simple Google search.  
The problem with the implementation of the idea is that the company name extraction 
from text requires significant natural language processing efforts, as Named Entity Recognition 
(NER) algorithms perform well with human names, not organization names. Moreover, due to 
updated privacy policies of Google, Google Search API [21] now, has restricted flexibility and 
lets the developer create search engines that can search only within a specific website, not the 
entire web. Keeping these challenges in mind, we decided to keep the extraction process of 
contextual features as manual and also keep a manual validation process for the output of the 
name extraction algorithm, as a safeguard. The automation of contextual feature extraction will 
be the primary objective of future extension of this work. 
Due to the fact, that the manual extraction of features from the web requires significant 
time and efforts, the convenient option was to work with a subset of the EMSCAD [19] dataset. 
One major criteria for selecting the records from the entire dataset of 17,880 instances was the 
presence of company profile as the name extraction algorithm was designed to work with 
company profile text. The pre-processing program extracted a small subset of records and for 
each record in the subset, the company profile field in the dataset was not empty. The Java 
Collections class was used to randomise the records. The ratio between the positive and 
negative instances was also kept within the 4:1 range. As a result, we ended up with a dataset 
of 368 instances among which, 94 (~25%) instances were fraudulent records and 274 instances 
were legitimate job ads. 
In order to extract the name of the company, we used the Stanford CoreNLP [22] natural 
language processing toolkit. The algorithm first parsed the HTML company profile using Jsoup 
[23] and then used a combination of the Named Entity Recognition (NER) and Parts of speech 
(POS) tagging libraries from the CoreNLP toolkit to come up with a name of the company. 
Manual validation revealed that around 85% of the company names were extracted correctly 
among the instances that had a valid company name within the profile text. 
Before the population process of binary contextual features for our dataset, the company 
website URL (if any), domain age, LinkedIn page URL for the company were extracted 
manually for each of the records. The domain age was extracted using open source domain age 
tool [24] which indicated how long the domain has been occupied by the company. The domain 
age provided an indicative baseline to decide whether or not the website was recently created. 
The rational for keeping the website age information was the tendency of the fraudsters to create 
fake websites just before posting a fake job advertisement. Nowadays, the ease of creating 
websites in a few clicks has increased the number of such fake websites where the company 
does not actually exist, but the website does. Several news reports and government agencies list 
these sorts of discrepancy [25,26]. Finally, to keep a track record of the fraudsters, the company 
profile texts of fraudulent job ads were kept in a look-up table as fraudsters often tend to use 
the same company profile for posting different fraudulent job advertisements. Fig. 1 shows a 














Fig. 1. Contextual feature extraction process. 
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Based on gathered knowledge, discussions and feasibility analysis, we decided to include 
the following binary features in our contextual feature space as part of our novel feature space 
design:  
• hasCompanyName: 1 if the name of the company is present in the profile text, 0 
otherwise.  
• hasCompanyWebsite: 1 if the company has a valid website, 0 otherwise.  
• hasMaturedCompanyWebsite: 1 if the company website is older than 1 year, 0 
otherwise.  
• hasLinkedInPage: 1 if the company has a valid LinkedIn page, 0 otherwise. 
• previouslySeenAsFraudulent: 1 if the job ad contains a company profile that was used 
in a previously found fraudulent job ad within the dataset, 0 otherwise. 
 
Apart from the above contextual features, other binary features were also considered 
based on previous research of Vidros, et al. [16]. The features in the entire feature space were 
divided into three major categories to differentiate between classes of features more precisely. 
These categories are, textual features, structural features, contextual features, where the 
contextual features are the highlights of the novelty of this work. The details of these features 
are discussed in the experimentation section. 
The machine learning toolkit used to conduct experiments was WEKA: Waikato 
Environment for Knowledge Analysis [27]. Once the dataset was mapped into the binary feature 
space, several classification algorithms, such as J48 decision tree, JRip rule-based classifier, 
Naïve Bayes classifier were used from the WEKA toolkit. It is imperative to notice that the idea 
behind using several classification algorithms was not to identify a superior one that fits the 
problem domain better, but to validate the consistency and improvement of performance 
measures across different experimental setup. Accuracy, precision and recall were the three 
metrics that was used to measure the performance of the model for different classification 
algorithms. The details about the performance of each of the classification algorithm are also 
listed in the experimentation and evaluation section.  
4. Experimentation and evaluation 
The experiments were conducted in two phases for each classification algorithm used. Each 
phase was given a particular name to better differentiate between the obtained performance 
measures. The difference between the two phases was the feature space of the training dataset. 
Experiment A contained textual and structural features in the dataset of 368 instances, whereas 
experiment B contained contextual features along with textual and structural features for the 
same dataset. Apart from the difference in feature space, the experimental environment, i.e., 
algorithm used, algorithm parameters, were kept constant across the two experiments, for each 
classification algorithm. 
Table 2. Proposed binary feature space. 
Feature 
Class 
Name Description Included in 
experiments 
Textual 
containsSpamWord? 1 if the title or description contains a 
spam word such as “easy job”, 
“work from home”, etc. 0 otherwise 
A, B 
hasConsecutivePunctuation? 1 if title or description contains 
consecutive punctuations (two or 
more ‘!’), 0 otherwise 
A, B 
hasMoneyInTitle? 1 if title contains “money”, “cash”, 
etc. 0 otherwise 
A, B 
hasMoneyInDescription? Same as above A, B 
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hasExternalPrompt? 1 if description or requirement 
contains external prompts such as 
“follow the link”, “send resume at”, 
etc. 0 otherwise 
A, B 
hasNonOrgEmailLinks? 1 if description or requirement 
contains personal email links, 0 
otherwise 
A, B 
isTelecommuting? 1 if telecommuting is true, 0 
otherwise 
A, B 
hasConsecutiveCappitalLetter? 1 if title or description contains 
consecutive capital letters (10 or 
more), 0 otherwise 
A, B 
educationLevelLow? 1 if required education level is high 
school or equivalent, 0 otherwise 
A, B 
hasBoldTextInDesciption? 1 if bold text is present in 
description, 0 otherwise 
A, B 
hasBoldTextInBenefits? Same as above A, B 




hasCompanyProfile?  1 for each record of our version of 
the dataset 
A, B 
hasCompanyLogo? 1 if company logo is present, 0 
otherwise. Information is directly 
acquired from EMSCAD dataset 
A, B 
hasJobIndustry? 1 if job industry is specified, 0 
otherwise 
A, B 
hasScreeningQuestion? Same as above A, B 
hasJobDescription? Same as above A, B 
hasSkillRequirement? Same as above A, B 
hasBenefits? Same as above A, B 
hasShortDescription? 1 if description is less than 60 words 
(4 standard sentences), 0 otherwise 
A, B 
hasShortCompanyProfile? Same as above A, B 
hasShortRequirements? Same as above A, B 
hasShortBenefits? Same as above A, B 
hasHTMLListInRequirements? 1 if HTML list element is present in 
requirement, 0 otherwise 
A, B 
hasHTMLListInBenefits? Same as above A, B 
Contextual 
hasCompanyName? 1 if profile text contains company 
name, 0 otherwise 
B 
hasCompanyWebsite? 1 if company has a valid website, 0 
otherwise 
B 
hasMaturedWebsite? 1 if domain age is greater than 1 
year, 0 otherwise 
B 
hasLinkedInPage? 1 if company has a LinkedIn page, 0 
otherwise 
B 
previouslySeenAsFraudulent? 1 if a fraudulent ad was seen with 
the same profile text, 0 otherwise 
B 
 
The pre-processing object-oriented program mapped each record of the dataset into a 
binary feature vector. These feature vectors were then fed to each of the classification 
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algorithms with a 10-fold cross validation. The cross-validation process randomises the training 
and test set for each of the folds. Table 2 lists the entire feature space totalling 30 binary features 
including textual, structural and contextual features along with the information about the 
corresponding experiments they were used in. The table does not list the binary class label. 
For J48 decision tree classification, a 10-fold cross validation process with the training 
dataset revealed an accuracy of 79.62% for experiment A (without contextual features). The 
precision and recall values for class label ‘t’ (fraudulent) were 0.651 and 0.436 respectively. 
On the other hand, for J48 decision tree classification, a 10-fold cross validation with the same 
training dataset yielded an accuracy of 94.29% for experiment B (with contextual features in 
the feature space). The precision and recall values for class label ‘t’ (fraudulent) were 0.910 
and 0.862 respectively. Experiments conducted with JRip rule-based classifier and Naïve Bayes 
classifier also demonstrated significant improvement of performance measures for experiment 
B over experiment A. Table 3 lists the confusion matrix for experiments A and B for all three 
classifiers. 
Table 3. Confusion matrix for experiments A and B for all three classifiers. 
Actual class 
Predicted class in experiments 
J48 experiment A J48 experiment B 
f (legitimate) t (fraudulent) f (legitimate) t (fraudulent) 
f (legitimate) 252 22 266 8 
t (fraudulent) 53 41 13 81 
 JRip experiment A JRip experiment B 
f (legitimate) 246 28 268 6 
t (fraudulent) 57 37 8 86 
 Naïve Bayes experiment A Naïve Bayes experiment B 
f (legitimate) 236 38 221 53 
t (fraudulent) 59 35 8 86 
 
As it can be seen from the confusion matrix, for J48 (experiment A), a total of 53 
fraudulent job advertisements were incorrectly classified as legitimate (false negative) whereas, 
22 instances of legitimate job postings were incorrectly classified as fraudulent (false positive). 
The confusion matrix explains the low precision and recall values for class label ‘t’ for 
experiment A. For experiment B with J48, a total of 13 fraudulent job advertisements were 
incorrectly classified as legitimate (false negative) whereas, only 8 instances of legitimate job 
postings were incorrectly classified as fraudulent (false positive). 
For experiments with J48 decision tree the number of false negatives was reduced from 
53 to 13 from experiment A to experiment B. On the other hand, the number of false positives 
was reduced to 8 in experiment B from 22 in experiment A. Moreover, the accuracy increased 
up to 94% in experiment B from only 79% in experiment A. The value of precision and recall 
for class label ‘t’ also increased from 0.651 to 0.910 and 0.436 to 0.862, respectively. These 
measures clearly demonstrate that the inclusion of contextual features such as company’s 
website information, existence of LinkedIn page and so on, makes a significantly positive 
impact on the outcome of the model and detects more fraudulent instances compared to the 
feature space without them. Fig. 2 illustrates the differences in performance measures obtained 




   
 
Fig. 2. Difference in performance measures for experiment A and B across three classifiers. 
(2a) Accuracy, (2b) Precision and (2c) Recall 
For both JRip rule-based classifier and Naïve Bayes classifier the accuracy, precision and 
recall values also improved significantly from experiment A to experiment B. JRip performed 
the best among the three classifiers yielding an accuracy of 96% for experiment B and Naïve 
Bayes showed the least impressive results for experiment B yielding an accuracy of 83%, 
although it is a major improvement over 73% of accuracy in experiment A. The precision 
values for class label ‘t’ improved from 0.569 to 0.935 and 0.479 to 0.915 for JRip and Naïve 
Bayes, respectively. Similarly, the recall value for class label ‘t’ increased from 0.394 to 0.915 
and 0.372 to 0.915 for JRip and Naïve Bayes, respectively. 
The performance measures of classifiers used in this research cannot be directly 
compared with the performance measures of the similar research done by Vidros, et al. [16], as 
the experiments use different subsets of the EMSCAD dataset and the pre-processing 
techniques are bound to be different. Hence, we evaluate our model based on the performance 
measures of two different experiments (A and B) as the differences clearly demonstrates the 
importance of contextual features in the feature space.   
As mentioned earlier in the research methodology section, the purpose of conducting 
experiments using different classification algorithm was not to identify a superior one for the 
problem domain, rather to present a scenario that demonstrates the consistent improvement of 
performance of classifiers, when the contextual features are included in the feature space. The 
results obtained by conducting the incremental feature space expansion from experiment A to 
experiment B clearly manifests our claim that the contextual feature space improves the 
detection performance of online recruitment fraud. 
5. Conclusion and future work 
The cloud-based recruitment platforms are one of the most used platforms on the internet. With 
the ever-increasing number of users of these platforms, personal and financial risks are 
increasing as well, making the platform vulnerable to threats. Although extensive work has 
been done in similar areas of research to study fraudulent user behavior (as discussed in the 
related work section), the domain of ORF needs considerable attention from the research 
community due to the gravity of impacts it bears on privacy and security. The limited 
information within the scope of a recruitment advertisement itself, also poses a challenge. New 
directions need to be explored to enrich the collection of features that are considered by a 
learning algorithm to successfully detect a fraudulent job advertisement. 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel feature space to improve the detection accuracy of 
ORF. Previous works [15,16] in the domain did not address any contextual features outside the 
scope of a job advertisement itself. Our proposed feature space considered these contextual 
features which resulted in a significant increase in terms of accuracy, precision and recall of 
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classes which makes the future extensions easy and manageable. The introduction of such 
contextual features can potentially pave way for a new dimension of research in the domain of 
ORF detection.  
The methodology proposed in this paper can have a major impact on numerous job 
advertisement portals that exist in the present era of internet. If more intelligent backend 
filtering systems can be implemented on these portals, based on the research methodology 
proposed in this study, more fraudulent jobs will be detected in the filtering stage. This will 
prevent regular users from accidentally revealing their personal information by applying for 
jobs that do not actually exist. Hence, to mitigate the risk of privacy and security, it is essential 
to develop intelligent systems embedded within these cloud-based recruitment platforms. Our 
research takes a step closer towards such intelligent filtering system. 
The future improvement scopes for our research includes the extension of feature space 
with more classes of features. However, the primary objective for our future extension would 
be to automate the extraction process of contextual features by designing custom search 
engines. Once the contextual feature extraction process is automated, it will then be feasible to 
validate the importance of contextual features more accurately using the entire EMSCAD 
dataset. Future automation process will also address the threats of validity of our proposed 
feature space. Network information and user behavior analysis can add more value in the future 
works as well. Moreover, the generation of large scale data sets with network and user level 
information can facilitate further research, which is essential to tackle this relentlessly 
increasing problem. 
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